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Policy Points:
 The International Health Regulations (IHR) are the governing frame-
work for global health security yet require textual and operational
reforms to remain effective, particularly as parallel initiatives are
developed.
 The World Health Organization (WHO) is the agency charged with
oversight of the IHR, and its leadership and efficient functioning are
prerequisites for the effective implementation of the IHR.
 We reviewed the historical origins of the IHR and their performance
over the past 10 years and analyzed all of the ongoing reform panel
efforts to provide a series of politically feasible recommendations for
fundamental reform.
 This article offers proposals for fundamental reform—with politically
feasible pathways—of the IHR, their operations and implementation,
WHO oversight, and State Party conformance.
Context: The International Health Regulations (IHR) have been the gov-
erning framework for global health security for the past decade and are a
nearly universally recognized World Health Organization (WHO) treaty, with
196 States Parties. In the wake of the Ebola epidemic, major global commis-
sions have cast doubt on the future effectiveness of the IHR and the leadership
of the WHO.
Methods: We conducted a review of the historical origins of the IHR and
their performance over the past 10 years and analyzed all of the ongoing reform
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panel efforts to provide a series of politically feasible recommendations for
fundamental reform.
Findings: We propose a series of recommendations with realistic pathways
for change. These recommendations focus on the development and strength-
ening of IHR core capacities; independently assessed metrics; new financ-
ing mechanisms; harmonization with the Global Health Security Agenda,
Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) Pathways, the Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness Framework, and One Health strategies; public health and clin-
ical workforce development; Emergency Committee transparency and gov-
ernance; tiered public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC)
processes; enhanced compliance mechanisms; and an enhanced role for civil
society.
Conclusions: Empowering the WHO and realizing the IHR’s potential will
shore up global health security—a vital investment in human and animal
health—while reducing the vast economic consequences of the next global
health emergency.
Keywords: International Health Regulations, global health security, World
Health Organization reform, crisis management, emergency response.
I n 2005, the World Health Assembly (WHA) fundamen-tally revised the International Health Regulations (IHR),1 a treatymeant to herald a new era of global cooperation to make the world
more secure. Yet in the aftermath of theWestAfrican Ebola epidemic, the
IHR face critical scrutiny—the World Health Organization (WHO),2,3
Harvard and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine,4 the
National Academy of Medicine,5 and the United Nations (UN)6 have
all urged major reforms.
Frustration with lack of progress on IHR implementation has led
Member States to launch independent programs with strikingly sim-
ilar aims. The United States established the Global Health Security
Agenda (GHSA), partnering with approximately 50 countries to accel-
erate progress towards global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to
biological threats.7 The United States has committed to support up to
30 countries in developing these capacities,8 and the 2015 G7 Summit
pledged to double that number.9 As the IHR face probing questions
and parallel initiatives are developed, we review their historical origins,
their performance, and their future.
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A Brief History
The IHR’s origins can be traced to a series of Sanitary Conferences
beginning in 1851 to forge an international agreement to curb the spread
of infectious diseases (originally cholera, followed by plague and yellow
fever) entering Europe from Asia, particularly India and the Levant.10
At that time, the concept of global health security meant protecting
Europe without unduly hindering trade. The Sanitary Conferences led
to a binding agreement in 1892—the International Sanitary Convention
(ISC)—focused on quarantine for cholera. European states subsequently
adopted additional conventions, which were incorporated into a single
ISC. By 1926, the ISC covered primarily cholera, yellow fever, and
plague. The raison d’eˆtre of the earliest treaties grew out of a perceived
security imperative for powerful countries. Most important was self-
protection against external threats, rather than safeguarding the public’s
health in every region of the world.
In 1907, the Rome Agreement created the Office International
d’Hygie`ne Publique (OIHP), entrusting this new agency with over-
seeing the international health agreements.11 At its creation in 1948,
the WHO assumed OIHP’s mandate and oversight of the ISC as well
as a separate convention on air travel. The WHO Constitution empow-
ered the Organization to adopt regulations to prevent the international
spread of disease (Articles 21, 22). Its power to adopt regulations is
far-reaching—binding on Member States unless they affirmatively opt
out.12 In 1951, the WHA exercised this authority to replace the ISC
with the International Sanitary Regulations (ISR), covering 6 diseases.
In 1969, the WHA revised the ISR, changed their name to the Inter-
national Health Regulations, and removed typhus and relapsing fever.
The WHA removed smallpox in 1981 after its global eradication. By
the time the WHA called for fundamental revision of the IHR in 1995,
the treaty applied to the same 3 diseases as the original ISC—cholera,
plague, and yellow fever—and no others.
The IHR (2005): International
Responsibilities of the WHO and States
Parties
With the emergence and pandemic potential of HIV/AIDS, the spread
of endemic diseases to new parts of the world, and outbreaks of viral
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hemorrhagic fever, it became clear that the IHR were insufficiently
flexible to respond to new infectious disease threats. The WHA called
for the IHR’s revision in 1995, and subsequent resolutions in 2001
and 2002 brought critical attention to the early detection of, and rapid
response to, public health threats; yet the WHA took little action to
shore up the obvious weaknesses in the IHR.13-15
The imperative for global health governance took on fresh urgency
with the advent of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Although
SARS cases emerged in November 2002, China delayed notifying the
WHO until February 2003. China took 2 additional months before
permittingWHO epidemiologists to enter Guangdong province, where
the outbreak originated. Later, Beijing conceded it had experienced
hundreds more cases than previously reported.16 Then WHO Director-
General Gro Harlem Brundtland criticized China’s delays,17 catalyzing
a major political shift toward a global norm of transparency and prompt
reporting, further driving IHR reform.18 TheWHA adopted the revised
IHR in 2005, with the treaty entering into force in 2007. Currently, the
IHR have 196 States Parties—every WHO Member plus Lichtenstein
and the Holy See.19
Scope
The revised IHR aim “to prevent, protect against, control and provide
a public health response to the international spread of disease” (Ar-
ticle 2). The IHR broke from a disease-specific model, embracing an
“all-hazards” strategy. They define “disease” to include all illnesses or
medical conditions, irrespective of origin or source, that could present
significant harm to humans (Article 1). The drafters intended to incor-
porate biological, chemical, and radio-nuclear events, as well as zoonotic
diseases and threats to food safety.
Recognizing the importance of travel and commerce, the IHR con-
tain a “balancing dynamic,” comprising public health, commerce and
human rights (Figure 1). This balance informs the health measures a
State Party may take for international travelers upon their arrival and
departure (eg, medical examinations, vaccinations, observation) and for
keeping ships and aircraft free of contamination and disease vectors.
States Parties must, though, have sufficient scientific evidence of the
risk posed and of whether the measure adopted is likely to ameliorate
that risk before taking restrictive travel or trade measures or impinging
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Figure 2. IHR Monitoring Framework: Core Capacities
Core Capacies to Detect, Assess, 
Report, and Respond 
Laboratories
Human resources
Surveillance
Preparedness
Response
Risk communicaon
Coordinaon and Naonal IHR Focal 
Point (NFP)
Naonal legislaon, policy, and 
ﬁnancing
Other Hazards
Zoonoc events
Food safety
Radiaon emergencies
Chemical events
Points of Entry
on human rights. The IHR require States Parties to carefully weigh
WHO recommendations in making that threat assessment.
The IHR obligate States Parties to develop core capacities to detect,
assess, report, and respond to potential public health emergencies of
international concern. The IHR (Annex 1) prescribe explicit capacities
for surveillance and response and for controlling and containing disease
at points of entry. The IHR identify minimum core capacities required
at the local, intermediate (regional/provincial), and national levels to
detect unexpectedmorbidity andmortality, report essential information,
confirm and assess the status of reported events, notify the WHO when
required (following the decision algorithm in Annex 2), and respond
effectively to contain and mitigate the event.
To guide States Parties in developing IHR core capacities, the WHO
published the IHR Core Capacity Monitoring Framework in 2010 (sub-
sequently updated).20 The IHR Monitoring Framework and accompa-
nying IHR Monitoring Tool identified 8 specific core capacities, as well
as 5 other capacities concerning points of entry and specific hazards
(Figure 2). For each of these 13 core capacities, the WHO identified
attributes and actions, asking states to use these attributes to assess their
compliance.
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The concept of core capacities embraced an “upstream” public health
strategy to prevent and contain outbreaks at their source. States Parties
agreed “to collaborate with each other to the extent possible” to develop
and maintain core capacities (Article 44). States Parties were required to
develop and maintain core capacities by 2012, with a possible extension
to 2014, and an additional extension to 2016. In 2015, the 68th WHA
extended the deadline to 2016 for all 81 States Parties that had requested
extensions. The WHA also decided to support 60 priority countries,
including those in west and central Africa, to meet core capacities by
June 20193 (Figure 3). Still, the Organization’s pattern has been to
accept continual delays in State Party compliance.
In line with their historical origins, the IHR contain rules regarding
points of entry at ground, air, and water borders, as well as health mea-
sures for conveyances, goods, containers, and travelers. Further, States
Parties must apply health measures in a nondiscriminatory manner, jus-
tify additional measures, collaborate with other states, and treat personal
data confidentially. States Parties must report to the WHO on their
IHR implementation and comply with prescribed dispute resolution
procedures. Importantly, the IHR also set up new mechanisms for two-
way communication and information sharing between the WHO and
States Parties. The IHRmandate that each State Party appoint aNational
IHR Focal Point (NFP) for routine information sharing and coordination
during health crises. All states have NFPs, at least on paper, but many
NFPs either are not well trained in IHR implementation or—more
often—are not properly tasked to routinely communicate with WHO
headquarters.
Notifications and Declarations of PHEICs
The IHR require States Parties to promptly notify the WHO of events
that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern
(PHEIC) with an ongoing obligation to inform and respond to follow-up
requests (Figure 4). Notifications alert the world to unfolding public
health events as well as marshal resources and coordinate global response
efforts. To guide notifications, Annex 2 contains a decision instrument
requiring States Parties to always notify the WHO of 4 specific dis-
eases: smallpox, wild poliomyelitis, novel human influenza, and SARS.
The algorithm also lists pandemic-prone diseases that trigger further as-
sessment, including cholera, pneumonic plague, yellow fever, and viral
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hemorrhagic fevers. Beyond listed diseases, States Parties must utilize
the instrument to assess any event of potential international public health
concern, including from unknown causes, to determine if it is unusual
or unexpected, may cross boarders, or may require travel or trade re-
strictions (Annex 2). Departing from previous international norms, the
IHR authorize the WHO to consider reports from unofficial sources,
such as scientists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), print and
broadcasting outlets, and social media platforms. When it receives an
unofficial report, the WHO seeks verification from the States Parties in
whose territory the event occurs.
The director-general (D-G) has sole power to declare a PHEIC. In
determining whether to declare a PHEIC, the D-G shall consider:
(a) information provided by the State Party; (b) the decision instru-
ment; (c) the advice of the Emergency Committee, which the D-G also
has sole discretion to convene; (d) scientific principles and evidence; and
(e) a risk assessment regarding human health, international spread, and
interference with international traffic. If the D-G declares a PHEIC, she
must issue temporary, nonbinding recommendations describing health
measures States Parties should take. She is also empowered to terminate
a PHEIC, which automatically expires after 3 months unless extended,
modified, or terminated earlier.
Declared PHEICs. The 2009H1N1 influenza pandemic put the IHR
to the test. The WHO declared the first-ever PHEIC after consultation
with Mexico and the United States.21 The WHO, however, was later
criticized for fueling public fear when it became clear the virus was
not highly pathogenic (although it still caused more than 200,000
deaths worldwide),22 but that criticism was primarily aimed at WHO’s
then definition of the pandemic influenza phases, which stood outside
the IHR framework. Many States Parties also disregarded the WHO’s
temporary recommendations against travel and trade restrictions; several
states banned pork imports, while others instituted travel restrictions
and advisories.23,24 In 2011, theWHOReview Committee charged with
reviewing IHR functioning during theH1N1pandemic cautioned, “The
world is ill-prepared to respond to a severe influenza pandemic . . . with
tens of millions at risk of dying.”25
In 2014, the D-G declared 2 further PHEICs, for polio and for Ebola.
The designation of polio appeared counterintuitive given there was only
a handful of cases. Yet small pockets of polio in Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and Nigeria were putting global eradication at risk. The following year,
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theWHA endorsed extension of the PHEIC given political instability in
the regions with ongoing outbreaks.26 The polio PHEIC declaration is
untraditional, appearingmore to rally political support in targeted states
than to alert the world to any large-scale reemergence of the disease.
In the case of Ebola, the D-G waited 4 months after announcing an
“unprecedented outbreak” in April 2014 before declaring a PHEIC on
August 8, 2014.27 The delay only looked worse with time, as leaked
WHO documents revealed that theWHO’s decisions were highly polit-
ical and lacked transparency.28 The WHO’s Ebola Interim Assessment
Panel in July 2015 said that urgent warnings “either did not reach se-
nior leaders or senior leaders did not recognise their significance.”2 The
Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola
wrote, “Confidence in the organization’s capacity to lead is at an all-
time low.”4 The temporary recommendations also suffered major flaws
of their own, asking states with limited infrastructure to ensure health
system capacities without adequate international assistance.29
The Ebola PHEIC declaration, though, ultimately rallied the interna-
tional community to bring the epidemic under control, but not before it
had claimed more than 11,300 lives.30 Most notably, President Obama
sent in military assets to build treatment facilities and provide logistical
support; the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted a historic resolution
calling Ebola a threat to international peace and stability; and the UN
Secretary-General created a UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response
(UNMEER). Although the D-G continued the PHEIC on December
18, 2015, human-to-human transmission has virtually ended in the 3
most affected countries. This robust, albeit delayed, response demon-
strates that political resolve and ample financing can bring seemingly
intractable health threats under control.
On February 1, 2016, the D-G declared the fourth, and
most recent, declaration of a PHEIC in response to the Zika
epidemic.31,32 Since Brazil reported Zika in May 2015, an estimated
1 million infections have occurred across 25 countries in the Americas.
IHR NFPs throughout the Americas have been reporting laboratory-
confirmed cases of Zika to the Pan American Health Organization
(PAHO), which has issued recommendations for the region.33 Most
concerning is a possible association between Zika virus and neurological
disease (Guillain-Barre´ syndrome [GBS]) or fetal abnormalities (micro-
cephaly). Curbing the Zika epidemicwill require effective vector control,
mosquito and human surveillance, and research for reliable diagnostic
The International Health Regulations 275
tests and a vaccine. The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
advised pregnant women to postpone travel to Zika-affected countries.
Women who are considering becoming pregnant should talk with their
doctor.34
This is the first time the D-G has declared a PHEIC for a mosquito-
borne disease, but the scope of the declaration was narrower than
for other PHEICs. Dr. Margaret Chan said, “I am now declaring
that the recent cluster of microcephaly cases and other neurologi-
cal disorders reported in Brazil, following a similar cluster in French
Polynesia in 2014, constitutes a Public Health Emergency of Interna-
tional Concern.”35,36 In other words, the PHEIC was for the cluster
of microcephaly and GBS rather than for the Zika virus itself. From a
legal perspective, the wording of the PHEIC introduces confusion as
neither microcephaly nor GBS is an infectious disease. These neurolog-
ical and congenital conditions per se do not appear to be hazards that
could cross borders under the meaning of Annex 2. It is the Zika virus
itself and the mosquito vector that have the potential for international
transmission.
Undeclared and Potential PHEICs. The world is now closely watching
outbreaks of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), which orig-
inated in Saudi Arabia in 2012. MERS has yet to trigger a PHEIC
declaration despite its reaching more than two dozen countries and ac-
counting for at least 1,621 laboratory-confirmed cases and 584 deaths as
of December 2015.37,38 By September 2015, the D-G had convened 10
Emergency Committee meetings,39 with the last two occurring during
and after the spread of the virus from Saudi Arabia to the Republic of
Korea, which sparked a large outbreak.40 The Emergency Committee
recommended careful monitoring and strengthened infection preven-
tion and control. Most MERS cases were linked to hospital settings, and
in the absence of sustained community transmission, the Committee
concluded the conditions to declare a PHEIC had not been met.41
For many global health crises, the D-G chose not even to convene
an Emergency Committee, including cholera in Haiti, the Fukushima
nuclear disaster in Japan, and chemical weapons use in Syria. Each event
would have required notification under Annex 2, in addition to the
several hundred events that have been reported to the WHO as potential
PHEICs. Confusion still exists as to what events warrant consideration
by an Emergency Committee and a potential PHEIC declaration. What
steps can and should the WHO take to ensure prompt notification and
276 L.O. Gostin and R. Katz
information sharing, and how can the D-G improve the transparency
and scientific rigor for declaring a PHEIC?
Operationalizing the IHR: Widespread
Noncompliance
The IHR afford a vital governing framework to limit the international
spread of disease. Yet, 10 years of experience has shed light on the critical
challenges in implementing the IHR, as well as major omissions in the
regulations. These challenges and gaps have become politically salient,
with deepening concern that the IHR, and theWHO itself, have failed to
fulfill the promises of sound governance and leadership. The past decade
has revealed an urgent need to improve the IHR’s text, but failure to
effectively implement the regulations has become far more important.
States Parties, in particular, have undermined the IHR’s effectiveness by
failing to fully comply with their international obligations. Below, we
explain the gaps and features of noncompliance that have undermined
the IHR’s operational viability.
National Core Capacities
National core capacities for preparedness, detection, and response form
the bedrock of global health security.42 Yet most States Parties have
yet to fully establish core capacities. In 2014, only 64 States Parties
reported meeting core capacities, while 48 failed even to respond to
the WHO43(p6) (Figure 5). Governments have not properly funded and
implemented required capacities, while international assistance has been
limited.43(p6) Achieving IHR core capacities by all states remains an
indisputable baseline for global health security. The more time it takes
to detect an event, the slower the response is and the more lives are lost.
Every WHO IHR Review Committee and all the major commissions
(Table 1) have demanded that States Parties build and strengthen core
capacities—all to little avail.2,43(p12,13)
Finding the resources to support health system capacity building has
been challenging.While States Parties committed to providing domestic
resources to build core capacities, national budgets often neglect this
fundamental commitment under the IHR. Many countries with limited
resources have had little bandwidth to prioritize building systems for
The International Health Regulations 277
Figure 5. IHR Implementation 2012 and 2014
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unknown threats as they have struggled to meet the everyday health
needs of their populations—ranging from primary care and essential
medicines to safe childbirth and healthy mothers and babies. Similarly,
the WHO and higher-income States Parties agreed to provide technical
and financial assistance to countries in need (Article 44), but with some
exceptions,44,45 very few have funded projects explicitly for building
IHR core capacities. The bulwark of international financing has been in
the form of vertical funding streams, such as for AIDS, tuberculosis, and
malaria. All in all, sustainable funding commensurate with the need for
IHR core capacities has come neither from national governments nor
from donors.
Meaningful Metrics
Through the IHR Monitoring Tool, the WHO expects States Parties
to conduct annual self-assessments on IHR implementation, focusing
on the 13 core capacities. States were supposed to issue formal reports
in 2012 (with additional reports in 2014 and 2016 for governments
that requested extensions) to declare if they had fully implemented the
regulations. If not, countries were supposed to submit a concrete plan
to reach full implementation.
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Table 1. Commissions on Global Health Security and IHR Reform
Panels, Committees, and Reports
Related to IHR Reform Organization
Ebola Interim Assessment Panel WHO
Review Committee on the Role of the
IHR in the Ebola Outbreak and
Response
WHO
Roadmap for Action on Ebola WHO
Advisory Group on Reform of WHO’s
Work in Outbreaks and Emergencies
with Health and Humanitarian
Consequences
WHO
Review Committee on the Functioning
of the IHR in Relation to the
Pandemic (H1N1)
WHO
UN Secretary-General High-Level Panel
on the Global Response to Health
Crises
UN
Commission on a Global Health Risk
Framework for the Future
National Academy of
Medicine (Secretariat)
Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on
the Global Response to Ebola
Academia
Even if all States Parties had reported accurately and in a timely
manner, national self-assessments are unacceptable and cannot ensure
uniformly high-quality national preparedness. States Parties have not
collected sufficient or the right kinds of data to produce quantitative
assessments of what are predominately qualitative questions. Govern-
ments, moreover, do not use a consistent set of evidence-based metrics
to measure their compliance. Most importantly, self-assessments are
inherently self-interested and unreliable, absent rigorous independent
validation. These deficiencies undermine the integrity and utility of
self-assessments.43(p6)
Beyond the failure of political will, country assessments have not
been directly linked to robust technical and financial assistance. Lower-
income states, perhaps understandably, express reluctance to upgrade
their capacities without such assistance. Overall, responsibility for
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fulfilling core capacities must be a shared one, requiring dedicated do-
mestic budgets, international financing, andWHO leadership. And ab-
sent these political and financial commitments to build core capacities,
the world is considerably less secure.
Timely and Full Notification
Although the IHR call for robust information sharing through report-
ing of potential PHEICs and subsequent requests for follow-up data,
countries continue to delay notifications and/or limit the information
reported. Delayed reporting and/or lack of transparency and coopera-
tion, for example, occurred in West Africa during Ebola and in Saudi
Arabia during MERS. Additionally, governments have failed to share
pertinent information about international travelers, either out of defi-
ance of their international obligations or simply due to confusion about
patient privacy—all despite guidance under Article 45.
The extant governance framework reveals an inherent tension, pro-
viding a disincentive to transparency and information sharing. The
IHR cannot effectively govern global health security unless govern-
ments promptly report novel infections. This follows the simple pattern
of the epidemiologic curve: the faster health authorities know about a
novel event, the faster they can mount an effective response, leading
to fewer cases (Figure 6). But governments have economic reasons to
withhold or delay transparent information sharing. They fear that once
they have disclosed an outbreak of a novel infection, other governments
and private parties may impose travel and trade restrictions, with severe
economic consequences. For example, once they have disclosed, the IHR
Emergency Committee could conclude that travel and trade restrictions
are warranted; or, more likely, governments or the private sector may
simply take action, disregarding WHO recommendations. The adverse
economic impact of early reporting under the IHR can dissuade States
Parties from being fully transparent.
Given previous patterns, national concern about the economic reper-
cussions of prompt reporting appears fully justified. Guinea, Sierra
Leone, and Liberia, for example, experienced aggregate cumulative losses
over 10% of GDP due to the Ebola outbreak.46 Canada during SARS
as well as Mexico and the United States during H1N1 suffered major
losses from precipitous reductions in tourism and trade. Yet, the failure
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Figure 6. Theoretical Framework: Early Detection Leads to Rapid Re-
sponse and Reduced Morbidity and Mortality
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to raise the global alert can ultimately be even more impactful in terms
of human life and national treasure. The Commission on a Global Health
Risk Framework for the Future concluded, “The global community has
massively underestimated the risks that pandemics present to human
life and livelihoods. . . . There are very few risks facing mankind that
threaten loss of life on the scale of pandemics . . . [and] that have the
potential for such catastrophic economic impact.” The Commission es-
timates that a pandemic in the 21st century could cost in excess of US$6
trillion.5
Despite the severe health and economic repercussions of unneces-
sary travel and trade restrictions, the WHO has not had the political
authority or capacity to prevent States Parties from disregarding its rec-
ommendations. The WHO is not a policing agency, and the IHR offer
scant inducements to ensure consistent State Party compliance. When
countries balance their IHR obligation to report against the risk of eco-
nomic sanctions, they may wait as long as possible before sharing vital
information.
WHO Governance
The Ebola epidemic highlighted major deficiencies in mobilizing
a large-scale, coordinated response to health emergencies. The IHR
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provide a framework for global health security, but that framework
functions only if the WHO is an effective leader and governments
build strong health systems. The WHO erred at multiple levels dur-
ing the Ebola epidemic. The D-G waited 5 months after cross-border
spread before declaring an emergency. The WHO Regional Office for
Africa (AFRO) and country offices impeded deployment of interna-
tional aid workers and equipment. Most importantly, the WHO failed
to mobilize adequate fiscal and human resources until the epidemic
was spinning out of control. The Organization eventually corrected
these mistakes, but its errors probably cost thousands of lives. The
fault lies, in fairness, not only with the WHO Secretariat but also
with Member States that have starved the agency of resources for many
years.
The reasons for the WHO’s failures are well understood but remain
resistant to change. In 2011, the agency cut its budget by nearly
US$600 million due to a severe fiscal deficit, notably its epidemic
response capabilities.47 Its regional structures have also been longstand-
ing problems, with major variability in regional organizations. The
D-G has called on governments and donors to build core capacities
and has asked for State Party compliance with the IHR, but without
impact.48 All the Ebola commissions have exhibited an implicit dis-
trust in the Organization to make the necessary reforms. Instead, each
panel has proposed a well-funded and accountable WHO Centre for
Emergency Preparedness and Response. The Harvard-LSHTM Indepen-
dent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola, for example, insisted that
a new center be quasi-independent, with a separate governing board
(Table 2).
The WHO is the agency charged with overseeing the IHR. Without
effective leadership, the IHR’s security framework breaks down. In other
words, a strong treaty text is insufficient without a well-funded and
robust operational response.
Major Gaps in the IHR
When the revised IHR were negotiated, Member States aimed to be
as inclusive of all public health threats as possible. However, there re-
mainedmajor omissions in the text, notably sample sharing and zoonotic
threats.
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Sample Sharing and Inequitable Distribution of
Benefits
Indonesia sent shock waves around the world in December 2006,
when its minister for health, Siti Fadilah Supari, refused to share sam-
ples of avian influenza A (H5N1) with the WHO. Indonesia’s deci-
sion revealed fissures within the international community. Developing
countries backed Indonesia’s claim that it was unfair to require sharing
viruses without any reciprocal obligation tomake vaccines andmedicines
affordable.
The WHO led a 5-year negotiation resulting in the 2011 Pan-
demic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework.49 The PIP Framework,
however, applies only to pandemic influenza, and not to other novel
pathogens such as SARS, MERS, and Zika. The PIP Framework stands
entirely outside the IHR. The regulations, furthermore, are mostly silent
on the health security issues of sharing biological materials and genetic
sequencing data (GSD), as well as equitable access to medical counter-
measures. Article 6(2) of the IHR, however, does offer some guidance for
information sharing, stating that States Parties shall continue to provide
relevant public health information to the WHO following a potential
PHEIC notification, including case definitions, laboratory results, source
and type of risk, number of cases and deaths, conditions affecting spread,
and the health measures that have been deployed. There is no explicit
mention of sharing biological materials or GSD, even though one could
broadly interpret Article 6(2) to encompass these data. Certainly, bio-
logical materials and GSD are pertinent public health information that
would shed light on the conditions affecting the spread of disease.
Neither the IHR nor the PIP framework, moreover, addresses a mod-
ern biosecurity hazard. In the not-too-distant future, scientists will be
able to sequence the genetic composition of pathogens, enabling them
to re-create novel viruses and to manipulate their genetic makeup. Al-
though, for example, smallpox has been eradicated, scientists can se-
quence its genome, synthesize a real smallpox virus using the genetic
code, and potentially enhance the virus’s ability for airborne transmis-
sion. These capabilities pose major biosecurity threats, which the IHR
and the PIP Framework do not govern. Harmonizing the IHR and
the PIP Framework and closing major coverage gaps would markedly
improve health security.
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Zoonotic Threats
Approximately 70% of all emerging infectious diseases have a zoological
origin, yet negotiators intentionally did not explicitly include animal
diseases in the IHR. The drafters were perhaps too deferential to exist-
ing regimes, such as the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE)
and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Although the
IHR broadly define “disease,” its currently realized scope is narrow, and
the regulations do not incorporate a “One Health” approach that fully
integrates animal and human health systems. The lack of such an ap-
proach could become a particularly salient omission for diseases like Zika
with large animal reservoirs and with the primary mode of transmission
through an insect source.
The IHRMonitoring Framework seeks to include zoonotic diseases as
“other hazards,” but the regulations fail to govern multisectoral engage-
ment and coordination on zoonotic diseases or the laboratory and surveil-
lance capacities required to identify disease in animals. As the world faces
the peril of novel zoonotic diseases and the overuse of antibiotics in both
humans and animals (exacerbating the global antimicrobial-resistance
crisis), it appears anomalous that the IHR do not facilitate and guide
research and practice at the intersection of human and animal health.
The Future of the IHR:
Recommendations for Reform
The IHR are the governing framework for global health security, yet
they require textual and operational reforms. The WHO Secretariat
is engaged in an internal reform process, ranging from the WHO
Roadmap for Action on Ebola3 to the Advisory Group on Reform of
WHO’s Work in Outbreaks and Emergencies with Health and Human-
itarian Consequences.50 In addition to the Ebola Interim Assessment
Panel,2 the agency established the WHO Review Committee on the
Role of the IHR in the Ebola Outbreak and Response.51 On January 30,
2016, the D-G announced internal reforms, including a single program
and incidentmanagement strategy to oversee all health emergencies. The
D-G stressed, however, yet again, that the program required sustainable
funding from Member States.52
The proliferation of internal and external reform processes could be
transformative. This is “the defining moment for the health of the global
community.”2 Yet, it is just as likely that the maze of recommendations
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will lead to weak or muddled reforms. In the sections that follow we
offer proposals for fundamental reform of IHR implementation, WHO
oversight, and State Party conformance (Table 3). We propose politically
feasible pathways to reform to avoid a long history of bureaucratic stagna-
tion. Thus, our proposals balance the ideal with the politically possible.
Build Robust IHR Core Capacities and Link
Them to Metrics and Financing
Meeting IHR core capacities requires mutual responsibility and ac-
countability. It starts with governments dedicating resources to build
and sustain health systems. Every State Party should undergo inde-
pendent, rigorous review of its implementation of IHR core capacities,
usingmeasurable metrics and targets, as explained below. Shared respon-
sibilities also require technical assistance and international financing to
close capacity gaps. Collective security is assured only by fulfilling these
mutual obligations to sustainably build, measure, and finance health
systems (Figure 7).
Building sustainable core capacities requires fresh thinking by both
donors and recipient countries. Too often, countries heavily dependent
on external funding follow the priorities of donors, agreeing to erect ver-
tical programs, stove-piped by disease. Yet, meeting IHR core capacities
requires the development of horizontal programs, including diagnostic
laboratories that can be used for more than just one pathogen or con-
dition; specimen transport systems that are applicable to all samples;
and event-based surveillance systems designed to pick up unusual or
unexpected public health events. Building core capacity also requires
integrating these systems into annual budgeting for health system
strengthening.
Develop Metrics and Rigorous Assessments
For IHR metrics to be meaningful, valued, and utilized, they must un-
dergo rigorous external evaluations. TheWHO should establish an inde-
pendent evaluation system with a feedback loop and continuous quality
improvement. Independent assessments would use evidence-based met-
rics and indicators. Unless assessment criteria are clear, transparent, and
valid, they will not be fully trusted. The measurable benchmarks for the
external assessment process, moreover, should be integrated directly into
Annex 1 of the IHR, which contains the core capacity requirements for
surveillance and response. It may be necessary either to amend Annex 1
or to operationalize it to incorporate more granular indicators.
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Figure 7. Pathway to Strong, Measured, Funded, and Sustained IHR
Core Capacities
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Parallel initiatives such as the GHSA and OIE’s Performance of Vet-
erinary Services (PVS) Pathways (measuring compliance with OIE stan-
dards on veterinary services) should be harmonized with the IHR. The
IHR are the only agreement with the international legal and political
legitimacy to set global security standards. Harmonizing extant multi-
ple standards within the IHR would be more holistic, ensuring a One
Health strategy and reducing redundancies for governments exposed to
multiple evaluations.
States often resist external assessment due to sovereignty concerns,
but the new system could be designed to foster cooperation. Evaluation
teams would comprise both domestic and external experts, so national
governments would be fully involved in the process. WHO, regional,
and country offices would all play a strategic role. Civil society should be
fully engaged, much like in UNAIDS monitoring mechanisms. Expert
panels would work constructively and collaboratively to identify capac-
ity gaps, develop a road map, and identify funding sources to achieve
measurable benchmarks for success. The mandate, therefore, would not
302 L.O. Gostin and R. Katz
be to give a passing or failing grade but to continuously improve health
infrastructure with strategic plans and adequate financing.
The World Bank’s Pandemic Emergency Facility (PEF) should tie
funding to country cooperation with IHR assessments. Additionally,
international donors such as regional development banks, the Global
Fund, and philanthropies could create funding streams for national IHR
core capacities, also conditioned upon rigorous assessments. All of these
measures would reinforce national commitments to build robust health
systems, which align well with the UN Sustainable Development Goal
of Universal Health Coverage (UHC).53
“What gets measured gets done.” But Laud Boateng, a GHSA Next
Generation Fellow from Ghana, shifts this discourse to better reflect
national experiences noting, “what gets measured gets done, but only
what gets political support gets measured, and only that which is funded
gets political support.”54 Thus, tying independent evaluations to exter-
nal funding would foster cooperation and marshal resources for building
core capacities.
Create Reliable and Consistent Financing
Mechanisms
Robust financing is required not only to build national health systems
but also to support the WHO’s own capacities and to ensure a surge in
resources in a health emergency. Several financing models could operate
separately or in concert. Increasing WHO Member State–assessed con-
tributions would be the most logical funding source. Mandatory dues
are more predictable and sustainable than discretionary funding for tar-
geted projects. Moreover, as the treaty oversight agency, theWHO holds
the legal obligation to implement the regulations, including securing
adequate financing.
Assessed dues, however, are politically fraught. Several high-income
Member States do not have sufficient confidence in the agency to jus-
tify an increase in their dues. They also want the discretion to direct
where their international assistance is going. Consequentially, it will
be necessary to create alternative financing mechanisms. The GHSA
Action Packages and the PEF are realistic funding sources, but they
should be synchronized with the IHR. The Global Fund offers another
model, whereby the WHO and the World Bank could host a donors’
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conference to boost international support and cooperation.2,55 Irrespec-
tive of the fundingmechanism, ensuring sustainable resources to develop
and maintain core capacities would benefit both low- and high-income
countries by strengthening security for all.
Invest in Human Resources
Ebola demonstrated that a well-trained, well-equipped health workforce
is crucial to an effective response, including doctors, nurses, community
health workers, lab technicians, infection control practitioners, and
public health experts. If there are insufficient health personnel and their
numbers are depleted even further by exposure to infection, the health
system will fail to control outbreaks. Educating, training, supporting,
and protecting health workers is a defining issue for global health
security.
Even a well-prepared workforce may not be able to cope in a public
health emergency. In such cases, the WHO must make provision for a
surge in human resources, such as through the Global Outbreak Alert
and Response Network (GOARN). The 2015 WHA endorsed a Global
Health Reserve Workforce but failed to guarantee funding.
Engage Civil Society to Hold States Parties to
Account
AIDS advocates demonstrated the power of civil society to demand
global health equity.56 Civil society organizations (CSOs) care for their
communities, monitor governments, and hold stakeholders to account.
As with other spheres of international law, such as in human rights or
climate change, civil society could offer “shadow” reports and advocate
for funding national capacities and fulfilling IHR and human rights
obligations. Harnessing the power of CSOs requires more than incor-
porating them into existing or new IHR functions. Borrowing from
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, the WHO could reg-
ularly host a Conference of the Parties where civil society could meet
with governments to advance IHR implementation. The Framework
Convention Alliance (CSOs committed to effective implementation of
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control) has propelled tobacco
control reforms. A similar CSO network for IHR implementation could
be transformative.
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Convene Transparent, Independent Emergency
Committee Meetings
After facing criticism for disclosing Emergency Committee members
only after the H1N1 PHEIC was terminated, the WHO improved pub-
lic trust by releasing member names for subsequent Emergency and
Review Committees.25(p16) The WHO also pledged transparency on ex-
pert committee members’ conflicts of interest.57 Concerns still persist,
however, that Emergency Committees are influenced by politics rather
than strictly scientific evidence. For example, the D-G and Emergency
Committee offered no evidence for their decisions regarding H1N1,25
very little for the first Emergency Committee meeting on Ebola,29 and
little during the initial meetings on MERS.58 They did give more trans-
parent explanations for polio59 and recent MERS and Zika Emergency
Committees.60 The D-G and Emergency Committee should routinely
publicly disclose their evidence and decision-making processes. Trans-
parency would include full minutes of Emergency Committee meetings,
web access to relevant documents, and live updates through social media
platforms.
Independent and transparent Emergency Committee decisionmaking
would build public confidence, but these reforms are of little value if the
D-G fails to convene an Emergency Committee. Outside the WHO’s
governing structure and drawing on civil society shadow reports, a
committee of independent experts, particularly from academia and civil
society, could coalesce to regularly review data on disease outbreaks
and propose actions, including recommending that the D-G convene an
Emergency Committee.
Institute a Reliable and Timely PHEIC
Declaration Process
The declaration of a PHEIC is the public face of the WHO’s outbreak
response, but the agency must respond long before an outbreak becomes
an international emergency. Beyond the IHR, the WHO has multiple
instruments supporting early action. For example, the WHO utilizes
the Emergency Response Framework (ERF) to measure the level of risk
and to inform the international community of an outbreak’s severity in
a graduated manner.61 As evidenced during the Ebola epidemic, using
2 distinct sets of governing rules (the ERF and the IHR) confused first
responders and the public. Similar confusion arose during the H1N1
pandemic, in which theWHOdid not coordinate the 6 pandemic phases
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(since revised) with the PHEIC.Given the public symbolism of a PHEIC,
multiple emergency response frameworks must be integrated with IHR
processes.
The WHO Ebola Interim Assessment Panel recommended introduc-
ing an intermediate-level emergency—allowing gradation while retain-
ing the power of a PHEIC.2 A gradient system would not necessarily
require a textual amendment to the IHR, as many diplomats fear. The
WHO could develop informal guidelines through Article 11, which
allows the agency to share information with States Parties, alerting
them to potential emergencies in a graduated fashion. Alternatively, the
WHA could adopt a new IHR annex that illustrates the risk gradient,
limiting negotiations only to the new annex. To maintain credibility,
different grades should trigger clear operational and financial strategies.
For example, an intermediate-level emergency could allow the WHO to
access resources from the Contingency Fund. Similarly, the World Bank
could release PEF funds based on graded emergency declarations by the
WHO.63 The promise of international assistance with adequate fund-
ing, even at an early stage, could provide additional incentives for States
Parties to report a potential PHEIC through the Annex 2 algorithm.
A full PHEIC declaration, however, would still be needed to raise the
global alert, stiffen political resolve, and mobilize major resources.
Enhance Compliance Through Carrots and
Sticks
State disregard for Article 43’s “Additional Health Measures” and Emer-
gency Committee temporary recommendations (eg, state travel and trade
restrictions and injudicious quarantines) undermines the IHR. For ex-
ample, during H1N1 and Ebola, States Parties ignored WHO recom-
mendations and imposed additional measures, impeding deployment of
critical medical supplies and health workers. Regional and international
carriers suspended flights; States Parties banned travel to and from, or
trade with, affected countries; and quarantines of health workers return-
ing from the region dampened the charitable instinct to help.
The WHO is not a policing agency that can readily impose sanc-
tions on States Parties for noncompliance with their legal obligations.
But it does have various means at its disposal to enhance compliance,
which it has failed to use. The D-G should publicly request clear
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rationales for and reconsideration of additional measures, while working
with States Parties to dismantle harmful policies. The D-G could more
actively encourage States Parties to pursue available dispute mediation
and arbitration under Article 56(3). She could similarly steer States
Parties toward the Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for
Arbitrating Disputes Between Two States. The WHO and the World
Trade Organization (WTO) could similarly encourage use of the WTO
Dispute Resolution procedures by States Parties harmed by additional
measures. Although the WTO is primarily constituted to adjudicate
WTO treaties, it could intervene in cases where state action adversely
impacts both public health and international trade—such as a poultry
ban during H5N1 outbreaks.
Beyond the WTO, other institutions could encourage IHR compli-
ance. For example, at various points during the H1N1 pandemic, the
FAO, OIE, and WTO together with the WHO issued joint statements
discouraging trade restrictions on pork and pigs.64,65 It may also be
possible to look to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) when one
country’s active violation of the IHR causes specific damage to either
the population or the economy of a second country.
There is still more the WHO could do to signal strong political com-
mitment to IHR compliance. The WHA, for example, could amend
Article 48 to elevate temporary recommendations from the Emergency
Committee during a PHEIC to a binding status. Even though States Par-
ties could still disregard their international obligations, more binding
treaty language could increase pressure to comply.
Realpolitik: Making IHR Reform
Politically Possible
Textual reforms are more difficult to achieve than operational reforms.
Reopening the full text of the IHR for revision would result in a multi-
year negotiating process and require considerable resources and could
weaken IHR norms and human rights safeguards. Our proposals for
reform, therefore, should be achieved, whenever possible, by textual
interpretation, understandings, and amendments to specific annexes,
rather than the main text.
There is a precedent for amending an IHR annex without reopening
the entire text to negotiation (2014 Resolution regarding Annex 7 and
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Yellow Fever).66 States Parties could find consensus on new language
or understandings focused only on particular annexes. Revisions to the
main text through textual interpretations or understandings would be
politically feasible. In arms control treaties, for example, States Parties
use the mechanism of Review Conferences to agree on a series of under-
standings to guide treaty implementation and State Party compliance.
The States Parties decide specifically not to reopen the original text
to revision. IHR States Parties could adopt similarly effective political
strategies, fully consistent with international law. “Smart” global health
diplomacy could enhance IHR functioning without bureaucratic hurdles
standing in the way of sensible reform.
The Way Forward
Ten years after the adoption of the IHR, it is time to realize their promise.
The unconscionable Ebola epidemic in West Africa opened a window of
opportunity for fundamental reform—for both the IHR and the Organi-
zation that oversees the treaty. That political window, however, is rapidly
closing. Donor fatigue, fading memories, and competing priorities (eg,
climate change, the Paris bombings, and fighting the Islamic State) are
diverting political attention. The promising results of the vaccine trial
Ebola c¸a Suffit (“Ebola that’s enough”),67 although transformative, could
further weaken political resolve. Empowering the WHO and realizing
the IHR’s potential would shore up global health security—a vital in-
vestment in human and animal health, while reducing the vast economic
consequences of the next global health emergency.
References
1. WHO. International Health Regulations (2005). 2nd edition.
Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization; 2008.
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241580410_
eng.pdf. Accessed June 29, 2015.
2. WHO. Report of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel.
July 2015. http://who.int/csr/resources/publications/ebola/report-
by-panel.pdf. Accessed July 30, 2015.
3. WHO. 2014 Ebola virus disease outbreak and follow-up to the
Special Session of the Executive Board on Ebola. May 23, 2015.
308 L.O. Gostin and R. Katz
http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA68/A68_ACONF5-
en.pdf. Accessed June 29, 2015.
4. Moon S, Sridhar D, Pate MA, et al. Will Ebola change the game?
Ten essential reforms before the next pandemic. The report of the
Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response to
Ebola. Lancet. 2015;386(10009):2204-2221.
5. Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future.
The Neglected Dimension of Global Security: A Framework to Counter
Infectious Disease Crises. Washington, DC: National Academy of
Medicine; 2016. www.nam.edu/GHRF. Accessed January 30,
2016.
6. UN Secretary-General. Press release: Secretary-General appoints
high-level panel on global response to health crises. April 2015.
http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sga1558.doc.htm.AccessedDe-
cember 10, 2015.
7. White House. Global Health Security Agenda: toward a world
safe and secure from infectious disease threats. 2014. http://www.
globalhealth.gov/global-health-topics/global-health-security/
GHS%20Agenda.pdf. Accessed February 25, 2016.
8. White House. Fact sheet: the U.S. commitment to the Global
Health Security Agenda. November 16, 2015. https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/fact-sheet-us-
commitment-global-health-security-agenda. Accessed December
4, 2015.
9. G7. G7 Leaders’ Declaration. June 8, 2015. http://www.
interaction.org/document/2015-g7-leaders-declaration. Accessed
June 30, 2015.
10. Howard-Jones N. The scientific background of the Inter-
national Sanitary Conferences, 1851–1938. Geneva, Switzer-
land: WHO; 1975. http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/
1975/14549_eng.pdf. Accessed June 30, 2015.
11. Gostin LO.Global Health Law. Cambridge, MA, and London, UK:
Harvard University Press; 2014.
12. WHO. WHO Constitution. 1946. http://whqlibdoc.who.int/
hist/official_records/constitution.pdf. Accessed June 30, 2015.
13. WHA. Revision and updating of the International Health Regu-
lations. WHA48.7. 1995.
14. WHA. Global health security: epidemic alert and response.
WHA54.14 2001.
15. WHA. Global public health response to natural occurrence, acci-
dental release or deliberate use of biological and chemical agents
or radionuclear material that affect health. WHA55.16. 2002.
The International Health Regulations 309
16. Heymann DL. The international response to the outbreak of
SARS in 2003. Phil Trans R Soc Lond B. 2004;359(1447):1127-
1129. http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/royptb/359/
1447/1127.full.pdf. Accessed June 30, 2015.
17. Fleck F. How SARS changed the world in less than six months.
Bull World Health Organ. 2003;81(8):625-626. http://www.
who.int/bulletin/volumes/81/8/News0803.pdf?ua=1. Accessed
June 30, 2015.
18. Heymann DL, Mackenzie JS, Peiris M. SARS legacy: outbreak
reporting is expected and respected. Lancet. 2013;381(9869):779-
781.
19. WHO. States Parties to the International Health Regulations
(2005). http://www.who.int/ihr/legal_issues/states_parties/en/.
Accessed June 30, 2015.
20. WHO. IHR Core Capacity Monitoring Framework: Checklist and Indi-
cators for Monitoring Progress in the Development of IHR Core Capacities
in States Parties. Geneva, Switzerland: WHO; 2013. http://www.
who.int/ihr/checklist/en/. Accessed April 2014.
21. Katz R. Use of revised International Health Regulations dur-
ing influenza A (H1N1) epidemic, 2009. Emerg Infect Dis.
2009;15(8):1165-1170.
22. McNeil DG Jr. W.H.O. estimate of swine flu deaths in 2009
rises sharply. New York Times. November 27, 2013. http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/11/27/health/who-revises-estimate-of-
swine-flu-deaths.html. Accessed June 30, 2015.
23. WHO. Swine influenza: statement by WHO Director-General,
Dr Margaret Chan. April 27, 2009. http://www.who.int/media
centre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_20090427/en/. Accessed July
1, 2015.
24. WHO. Implementation of the International Health Regula-
tions (2005): responding to public health emergencies: report
by the Director-General. May 15, 2015: para. 10. http://apps.
who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA68/A68_22-en.pdf. Accessed
July 1, 2015.
25. WHO. Implementation of the International Health Regula-
tions (2005): report of the Review Committee on the Func-
tioning of the International Health Regulations (2005) in
Relation to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009. Doc. A64/10. May 5,
2011. http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA64/A64_10-
en.pdf. Accessed Aug 3, 2015.
26. WHO. Statement on the 5th IHR Emergency Committee meeting
regarding the international spread of wild poliovirus. May 5, 2015.
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2015/polio-
5th-statement/en/. Accessed July 1, 2015.
310 L.O. Gostin and R. Katz
27. Horton R. A plan to protect the world—and save WHO. Lancet.
2015; 386(9989):103.
28. Associated Press. Emails: UN health agency resisted
declaring Ebola emergency. New York Times. March 20,
2015. http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/03/20/world/ap-
un-who-bungling-ebola.html. Accessed June 30, 2015.
29. WHO. Statement on the meeting of the International Health
Regulations Emergency Committee regarding the 2014 Ebola out-
break in West Africa. August 8, 2014. http://www.who.int/media
centre/news/statements/2014/ebola-20140808/en/. Accessed Au-
gust 3, 2015.
30. WHO. Ebola virus disease outbreak. www.who.int/csr/disease/
ebola/en/. Accessed December 10, 2015.
31. Fauci AS, Morens DM. Zika virus in the Americas: yet another
arbovirus threat. N Engl J Med. Published online January 13,
2016. doi:10.1056/NEJMp1600297.
32. Lucey DR, Gostin LO. The emerging Zika pandemic: enhanc-
ing preparedness. JAMA. Published online January 27, 2016.
doi:10.1001/jama.2016.0904.
33. WHO and PAHO. Epidemiological alert: neurological syndrome,
congenital malformations, and Zika virus infection: implica-
tions for public health in the Americas. December 1, 2015.
http://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=11599&Itemid=41691&lang=en. Accessed January
31, 2016.
34. Petersen EE, Staples JE, Meaney-Delman D, et al. Interim guide-
lines for pregnant women during a Zika virus outbreak—United
States, 2016. Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2016;65(2):30-33.
35. WHO. Director-General summarizes the outcome of the
Emergency Committee regarding clusters of microcephaly and
Guillain-Barre´ syndrome. February 1, 2016. http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/news/statements/2016/emergency-committee-zika-
microcephaly/en/. Accessed February 25, 2016.
36. WHO. Statement on the first meeting of the International
Health Regulations (2005) (IHR 2005) Emergency Committee
on Zika virus and observed increase in neurological disorders
and neonatal malformations. February 1, 2016. http://www.who.
int/mediacentre/news/statements/2016/1st-emergency-
committee-zika/en/. Accessed February 25, 2016.
37. Lucey DR. MERS in Korea: why this outbreak can be stopped
soon. Center for Strategic and International Studies. June 7, 2015.
http://csis.org/files/publication/150608_MERS%20in%20Korea
%20Why%20This%20Outbreak%20Can%20Be%20Stopped%
20Soon.pdf. Accessed July 1, 2015.
The International Health Regulations 311
38. WHO. Middle East respiratory syndrome—Saudi Arabia. Decem-
ber 4, 2015. http://www.who.int/csr/don/4-december-2015-mers-
saudi-arabia/en/. Accessed December 8, 2015.
39. WHO. Emergency Committee—9th meeting summary: briefing
notes on MERS-CoV. June 22, 2015. http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/news/mers/briefing-notes/update-22-june-2015/en/.
Accessed July 1, 2015.
40. Gostin LO, Lucey DR. Middle East respiratory syndrome: a
global health challenge. JAMA. Published online June 17, 2015.
http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleID=2338303.
Accessed July 1, 2015.
41. WHO. Statement on the eighth meeting of the IHR Emergency
Committee regarding MERS-CoV. February 5, 2015. http://www.
who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2015/8th-mers-emer-
gency-committee/en/. Accessed July 1, 2015.
42. Gostin LO, Friedman EA. A retrospective and prospective analysis
of the West African Ebola virus disease epidemic: robust national
health systems at the foundation and an empowered WHO at the
apex. Lancet. 2015;385:1902-1909.
43. WHO. Implementation of the International Health Regula-
tions (2005): report of the Review Committee on Second
Extensions for Establishing National Public Health Capaci-
ties and on IHR Implementation: report by the Director-
General. March 27, 2015: para. 17. http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/
pdf_files/WHA68/A68_22Add1-en.pdf. Accessed June 29, 2015.
44. Phu TD, Long VN, Hien NT, et al. Strengthening global health
security capacity—Vietnam demonstration project, 2013. Morb
Mortal Wkly Rep. 2014;63(4):77-80.
45. Lescano AG, Salmon-Mulanovich G, Pedroni E, Blazes DL.
Outbreak investigation and response training. Science. 2007;
318(5850):574-575.
46. United Nations Development Group (UNDG)—Western and
Central Africa. Socio-Economic Impact of Ebola Virus Disease in
West African Countries. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: UNDG; 2015.
http://www.africa.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Reports/ebola-
west-africa.pdf. Accessed January 31, 2016.
47. Gostin LO, Friedman EA. Ebola: a crisis in global health leader-
ship. Lancet. 2014;384:1323-1325.
48. WHO. Report by the Director-General to the Executive Board at
its 138th session. January 25, 2016. EB 138/2.
49. Fidler DP, Gostin LO. The WHO Pandemic Influenza Prepared-
ness Framework: a milestone in global governance for health.
JAMA. 2011;306(2):200-201.
50. WHO. Advisory Group on Reform ofWHO’sWork in Outbreaks
and Emergencies with Health and Humanitarian Consequences.
312 L.O. Gostin and R. Katz
http://www.who.int/about/who_reform/emergency-capacities/
advisory-group/en/. Accessed December 10, 2015.
51. WHO. Review Committee on the Role of the Interna-
tional Health Regulations (2005) in the Ebola Outbreak and
Response. http://www.who.int/ihr/review-committee-2016/en/.
Accessed December 10, 2015.
52. WHO. Global Policy Group statement on reforms of WHO work
in outbreaks and emergencies. January 30, 2016. http://www.
who.int/dg/speeches/2016/reform-statement/en/. Accessed Jan-
uary 31, 2016.
53. Jha A, Kickbusch I, Taylor P, Abbasi K. Accelerating achievement
of the sustainable development goals: a game changer in global
health. BMJ. 2016;352:i409. doi:10.1136/bmj.i409.
54. Boateng L. Perspectives in global health security: effective preven-
tion, detection and response to global pandemics. CRDF Global
Sponsored Briefing. Washington, DC. October 2015.
55. The Lancet. Ebola: what lessons for the International Health Reg-
ulations? Lancet. 2014;384(9951):1321. http://www.thelancet.
com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(14)61697-4/fulltext.
Accessed March 6, 2015.
56. Buse K, Gostin LO, Friedman EA. Pathways towards a framework
convention on global health: political mobilization for the human
right to health. In: FreemanM, Hawkes S, Bennett B, eds. Law and
Global Health. Current Legal Issues, vol. 16. London, UK: Oxford
University Press; 2014.
57. WHO. Frequently asked questions on IHR Emergency Commit-
tee. http://www.who.int/ihr/procedures/en_ihr_ec_faq.pdf. Ac-
cessed July 3, 2015.
58. WHO. Statement on the second meeting of the IHR Emergency
Committee concerning MERS-CoV. July 17, 2013. http://
www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2013/mers_cov_
20130717/en/. Accessed July 3, 2015.
59. WHO. Statement on the meeting of the International Health
Regulations Emergency Committee concerning the international
spread of wild poliovirus. May 5, 2014. http://www.who.int/
entity/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/polio-20140505/
en/index.html. Accessed July 3, 2015.
60. WHO. Statement on the ninth meeting of the IHR Emergency
Committee regarding MERS-CoV. June 17, 2015. http://www.
who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2015/ihr-ec-mers/en/. Ac-
cessed July 3, 2015.
The International Health Regulations 313
61. WHO. Emergency Response Framework. 2013: p. 19. http://
apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/89529/1/9789241504973_
eng.pdf?ua=1. Accessed July 2, 2015.
62. WHO. Current WHO phases of pandemic alert for Pandemic
(H1N1) 2009. http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/phase/en/.
Accessed August 3, 2015.
63. Standley CJ, Sorrell EM, Kornblet S, Vaught A, Fischer
JE, Katz R. New framework for global public health emer-
gency reporting and response. Science. 2015;348(6236):762-763.
doi:10.1126/science.aaa5521.
64. FAO, WHO, OIE, WTO. Joint FAO/WHO/OIE/WTO state-
ment on influenza A (H1N1) and the safety of pork. May
2, 2009. http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/
h1n1_20090502/en/. Accessed July 1, 2015.
65. FAO, WHO, OIE. Joint FAO/WHO/OIE statement on influenza
A (H1N1) and the safety of pork. May 7, 2009. http://www.who.
int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_20090430/en/. Ac-
cessed July 5, 2015.
66. WHO. Implementation of the International Health Regula-
tions (2005). May 24, 2014. WHA67.13. http://apps.who.int/
gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA67/A67_R13-en.pdf. Accessed Decem-
ber 16, 2015.
67. Henao-Restrepo AM, Longini IM, Egger M, et al. Efficacy and
effectiveness of an rVSV-vectored vaccine expressing Ebola surface
glycoprotein: interim results from the Guinea ring vaccination
cluster-randomised trial. Lancet. Published online July 31, 2015.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(15)61117-5.
Funding/Support: None.
Conflict of Interest Disclosures: All authors have completed and submitted the
ICMJE Form for Disclosure of Potential Conflicts of Interest. No disclosures
were reported.
Acknowledgments: The authors thank Eric A. Friedman and Mary C. DeBartolo
of the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law, Georgetown
University Law Center.
Address correspondence to: Lawrence O. Gostin, O’Neill Institute for Na-
tional and Global Health Law, Georgetown University Law Center, 600
New Jersey Ave NW, McDonough 574, Washington, DC 20001 (email:
gostin@law.georgetown.edu).
